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Chris Edson, NHH Masters Student 
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Abstract 
This paper investigates if the Norwegian wealth tax imposes capital constraints on small 
privately held businesses. A panel of 31,428 Norwegian firms from 2005 to 2009 is used to 
estimate two models of capital constraints. The models are estimated using the Fixed Effects 
method. When firms are sorted a priori into two groups based on the wealth tax burden of the 
primary owner, the non-taxed firms are found to be slightly more constrained than the taxed 
firms, at a 10% and 5% confidence level depending on the model. Sorting based on the 
wealth tax is the most effective method of sorting firms into more or less constrained groups, 
while more traditional methods proved ineffective in this panel. The negative capital 
constraining effects of the wealth tax are therefore minimal; the tax affects only the private 
firms least reliant on internal financing. 
 
JEL classification: H23, G38 
Keywords: Wealth Tax, Norway, Capital Constraints 
 
1. Introduction 
Wealth taxes are uncommon and under increasing public attack to be repealed. Since 2006 
Sweden, Spain, Finland, Iceland and Luxembourg have all abolished their wealth tax 
(Eurostat 2009). The February 2012 survey by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) of the Norwegian economy listed capital taxation as one of the 
                                                            
1
 This is a condensed version of my master thesis, written as a part of the Master of Science in 
Economics and Business Administration program - Major in International Business. Neither the 
institution, nor the advisor is responsible for the theories and methods used, or the results and 
conclusions drawn, through the approval of this thesis. Part of this thesis was written while I 
was sitting in Statistics Norway, whose hospitality is greatly appreciated. Comments and 
suggestion from Erik Fjærli (SSB) and Øivind Anti Nilsen (NHH) have improved this paper. I am 
grateful for their time and effort. All the remaining errors are my own. 
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few areas in need of improvement; it was addressed in 4 of the 15 recommendations made by 
the report. Of these recommendations the report was particularly critical of the wealth tax. 
The report states that it generates little tax income but caused large increases in the effective 
tax rate and the unequal treatment of housing property leads to distortions in investment. 
Using a nominal rate of return of 4% and an inflation rate of 2% the Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance calculated that the effective tax rate on equity shares for an individual paying the 
wealth tax is 113% (OECD Report, 2012). This rate suggests that individuals subject to the 
wealth tax will be unwilling to invest in any projects.  
 
Figure 1: Effective Tax Rates from OECD Report. 
 
This chart is reproduced as presented in the 2012 OECD Economic Survey on Norwegian. 
 
The OECD report also references the public debate and discussion surrounding the wealth 
tax. This debate focuses on many possible negative consequences from the wealth tax, but 
relatively few positive impacts. The main concerns are for the discouragement of domestic 
investment and the flight of wealthy individuals from the nation. Because the double taxation 
on capital gains is conceptually easy to explain, using the Effective Tax Rate (ETR) shown in 
figure 1, this argument is typically made without any reference to published studies. These 
two effects are also often mentioned together to justify an expected decrease in growth in 
countries that have a wealth tax (Hansson, 2002).  
 
There is a small but growing body of research into various wealth taxes and their effects, that 
focuses both on the moral implications related to the distribution of the tax burden as well as 
empirical measurements of behavioral changes. Michalos (1988) writes an argument for 
implementing a wealth tax in Canada to address growing wealth inequality and a high 
concentration of wealth in entrenched family lineages. Joumard (2002) reviews the tax 
systems of OECD countries and concluded that the lack of a wealth tax greatly undermined 
the redistributive properties of many tax systems. Isaacs (1977) makes the opposite moral 
argument that the tax is a levy against success and that it is incompatible with the United 
States’ national identity. He goes further to state that issues arising from the expected non-
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compliance with the tax (tax avoidance) would make the tax unable to achieve its intended 
goal. 
 
Econometric explorations of the empirical impact of the wealth tax are rare. Hansson (2002 
& 2008) uses a cross country panel to investigate the effects of abolishing the wealth tax, 
finding a slight increase in both Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth and entrepreneurship. 
Unfortunately both of these studies are possibly biased by their inability to measure all 
correlated government activity, a common concern in national level cross-country studies 
(Slemrod, 1995). Pichet (2007) finds that the French wealth tax leads to capital flight and 
high levels of tax avoidance. The overall cost he calculates from the tax is higher than the 
received revenue. 
 
Tax theory based on the optimum distribution of tax burden between capital and labor is also 
applicable to the wealth tax because as Mieszkowski (1969) shows, a wealth tax is equivalent 
to a tax on business profits, assuming that the productivity of the capital stock is 
homogenous. If the productivity is assumed to be heterogeneous or monopoly pricing power 
exists, the wealth tax should be more socially efficient than a tax on business profits while 
taxing essentially the same base. Because of Mieszkowski’s findings, if corporate income 
taxes decrease investment or economic growth then a wealth tax would also be expected to 
have a similar effect. Cummins, Hasset, and Hubbard (1996) found a significant negative 
effect on investment from changes in corporate income tax. Hall and Jorgenson (1967) also 
found that increasing the liberalness of the tax code’s depreciation allowance, a decrease in 
the present value of the tax on capital, increased the investment rate. 
 
As all taxes introduce inefficiencies into the market, a tax on capital cannot be viewed as a 
single event, but instead must be viewed as one of multiple tools at the government’s disposal 
to fund public goods. Kocherlakota (2005) looked into the effects of various forms of 
taxation on a system where individuals could invest in human or physical capital. In this 
model the individuals had a stochastic ability score with persistent shocks that modified the 
return received from capital. Because of the possibility of persistent negative shocks 
throughout an individual’s life, a wealth tax with redistribution was found to be societally 
pareto optimal. Using a different model that also allowed for investment in human or physical 
capital, Pecorino (1993) found that the growth maximizing mix of taxation is levied more 
heavily against the primary factor used in the consumption sector; however his initial model 
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assumed that depreciation was not allowed. After adding depreciation for only physical 
capital the optimum growth taxation policy was skewed towards higher taxation on physical 
capital. Nerlove, Razin, Sadka and Weizsacker (1993) also discussed that if human capital 
depreciates, and they argue that it does, the current taxation policies heavily favor 
investments in physical capital because of the allowed depreciation differential.  
Unlike an income tax, the effects of the wealth tax are persistent during periods of non-
investment on the part of the individual, which leads to an interdependence between the 
calculated tax rate from the wealth tax and the taxpayer’s decisions. Discussions surrounding 
the wealth tax effects tend to only focus on the cost of the tax on investment actions, ignoring 
the fact that the tax burden is much heavier on inaction on the part of the individual. 
Returning to the OECD reported effective tax rates (ETR) including the wealth tax, first 
presented in section 1.1, we can see how important it is when discussing the wealth tax to 
contrast any proposed effect on investment with the alternative effect of non-investment or 
underinvestment on the part of the taxed individual.  
The OECD calculated the effective tax rate as the combined corporate and wealth tax burdens 
divided by the total profit in the period. The profit was calculated as simply the rate of return 
multiplied by the productively invested capital, and the corporate tax is then this profit 
multiplied by the corporate tax rate. Calculating the wealth tax is not quite as straight 
forward, as it is assessed on the total wealth owned at the end of the period, it includes the 
total wealth at the beginning of the period plus any profit earned in the period, or: 
Wealth	Tax = Wealth	Tax	rate ∗ Total	Starting	Wealth + Proit 
One key assumption here is that the starting wealth used to calculate the wealth tax due is not 
identical to the wealth base used to calculate the one period profit, as not all the owner’s 
possessed wealth is necessarily productively invested. The OECD report assumes an even 
distribution of the individual’s wealth between productive and non-productive assets. Unlike 
an income tax which is indifferent to the proportion of total wealth that is productively 
invested, the wealth tax penalizes non-productive wealth. The ETR decreases as the 
percentage of wealth actively generating returns increases (figure 2).  
If 100% of an individual’s wealth is actively generating returns the effective tax rate is only 
85.15% compared to the OECD reported ETR of 113%, a decrease of nearly 30 percentage 
points. While it may seem unlikely that an individual would only possess assets that are 
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actively invested, the reality is that only a portion of an individual’s total wealth is taxed. 
Most wealth taxes provide an exemption for a set amount of wealth and only tax the portion 
of the individual’s wealth in excess of this threshold. The main source of non-productive 
(excluding gains from capital appreciation) wealth holding for the average family is their 
home, however typically are also generous allowances and favorable valuations for housing 
that minimizes homeownerships impact on the individual’s wealth. The Norwegian wealth 
tax, discussed in detail in section 2, provides both of these reductions to the burden of the 
wealth tax 
Figure 2 
 
ETR was calculated using a rate of return of 4%, an inflation of 2%, a corporate tax rate of 56%, and a wealth tax 
rate of 1.1%. The assumed rates are identical to the OECD assumptions used to generate figure 1. 
 
Unlike an income tax the wealth tax rate is also highly variable depending on the rate of 
return that an asset is earning. The cost of the wealth tax is greater on underperforming assets, 
but lower for assets with higher rates of return (figure 3). The wealth tax therefore does not 
discourage investment in general; instead it discourages holding non-performing or 
underperforming assets. 
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Figure 3 
 
 Calculated using a rate of return of 4%, an inflation of 2%, a corporate tax rate of 56%, and a wealth  
tax rate of 1.1%. Three ratios of non-productive assets were used, 50%, 75%, and 100%. 
 
The Remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the relevant details of 
the current Norwegian wealth tax laws. In section 3 the models use in this investigation and 
the modivation for their choice is discussed, followed by a description of the panel of firms 
used as data in section 4. The findings of this report are shown in section 5, and a brief 
discussion of the findings is included in section 6. 
2. The Norwegian Wealth Tax 
The Norwegian tax change is a useful event to study because the motivation behind the 
change was not to effect more efficient capital investment, but increasing the fairness and 
redistributive profile of the national tax system. Unless otherwise noted the information in 
this section is from Report No. 11 to the Storting: Evaluation of the 2006 Tax Reform 
(Norwegian 2011). The Norwegian governmental report states that “From the time it took 
over in autumn 2005, however, the Government has been concerned with strengthening the 
distribution profile of the tax system, and that wealth tax should play an important part in this 
respect.” This is useful for a study of firm reaction to tax changes as it implies this tax reform 
is not a part of a larger business invigoration policy or legal initiative and any changes in 
investment detected are not due to unaccounted for political changes. 
Before 2006 the Norwegian Wealth tax applied to any personal wealth over 151,000 NOK 
regardless of whether the wealth was owned by a single or married individual. Wealth above 
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 this level was subject to a 1.1% yearly tax. 
value of equity holdings to be excluded from the tax, and an 80% rule where the wealth tax 
was only applied at 1.1% until the point where the
individual’s ordinary income. Once the
was taxed at a rate of 
taxpayer, which increased the allowance to 1.4 million 
the rules for the e
shifted the tax burden to the higher wealth individuals while also increasing the level of tax 
paid by these individuals.
 
The change in the allowance has reduced the number of taxpayers paying the wealth tax from 
33 percent in 2005 to only 17 percent in 2011. The overall effect of these changes 
an increase in wealth tax revenue while narrowing the tax base.
The Norwegian government believes that this change to the wealth tax is a vital part of 
correcting the 
tax burden of individuals by income decile.
quity discount and the 80% rule were slowly phased out. The overall change 
*Source SSB
redistributive profile of the total tax in the country. Figure
0.6%. In 2006 the allowance was increased to 700,000 NOK per 
 
Year Individual 
Allowance
2005 151,000
2006 700,000
2007 700,000
2008 700,000
2009 700,000
Figure 5
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tax code has failed to properly continue the progressive intentions of the tax system. In 2005 
an individual with an income in the top 1% paid the same average tax as an individual in the 
bottom 40% of the income distribution, significantly less than someone with an income in the 
70% range. The wealth tax change was able to correct this issue and lead to a more 
progressive tax burden based on income distribution. Figure 7 expands the top 10% of the 
income into ten separate categories and separates the taxes paid into income and wealth tax, 
showing that the wealth tax pays an integral part in ensuring the progressivity of the tax 
system at the highest income levels. 
Figure 6: Average assessed tax as a share of gross income by decile 
 
Report on the tax assessment as a share of gross income by decile. Reproduced from the Norwegian report 
to the Storting on the effects of the tax law reforms. 
 
 
Figure 7: Average Tax Rate of the top 10% income decile 
 
 Figure as shown in Report No. 11 to the Storting: Evaluation of the 2006 Tax Reform. 
  
 
The Norwegian report to the Storting on the effects of the tax reform mentions the possible 
negative investment effects from the wealth tax, but considers them to be less of a concern 
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than the OECD report. The Norwegian report states that while it does not believe that the 
wealth tax “makes investment in Norway less interesting than investment abroad for 
Norwegian investors,” it is concerned that the “wealth tax can to some extent limit the supply 
of capital to enterprises that are obliged to resort to the Norwegian capital market… 
reduce(ing) the overall socio-economic return on the capital”. There does remain one 
valuation differential that both reports suggest is problematic and will cause misallocation of 
investment capital, the greatly reduced valuations provided to residential property. The 
ultimate conclusion of the Norwegian report is that the wealth tax balances to social need for 
a progressive and redistributive tax system with the needs of the business community. The 
OECD report is more critical of the possible consequences of the wealth tax for business 
investment, and considers the benefits of societal equality and fairness to be of less 
importance. 
3. Cash Constrained Models 
3.1 The Sales Accelerator Model 
In order to investigate if the wealth tax imposes capital constraints on small privately held 
firms two models were used: the sales accelerator model and the Caggese (2007) model. The 
standard models used in investment literature focus on either the Q model of investment or 
Euler Equations.  Both methods are based around the maximization of the market value of 
equity, and use the capital market arbitrage condition as their starting point. The standard 
transformation attempts to explain investment in long term fixed assets as a percentage of the 
firm’s total fixed assets, ,
,
, by assuming quadratic adjustment costs. It simplifies to 
, 
!, 
= " +
1
$
%, + &, 																																																																																																																										1 
Where Q() is the ratio of the market value of the firm’s equity and liabilities over the book 
value of the firm’s equity and liabilities (Perfect and Wiles, 1994), and " is an individual 
effect to allow for heterogeneous firms. Because calculation of %  requires market values for 
the firm, investigations into the cash constraints firms face using the Q model have focused 
only on publicly traded firms. Likewise the private firms currently being investigated lack the 
proper information necessary to calculate % . This constraint suggests that the sales 
accelerator model may be the most appropriate and best performing measure of future 
investment opportunities available to the firm. Accelerator models assume a fixed ratio 
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between output and capital level, at least over a small range of investment levels. Expected 
sales are given exogenously to the model, but are correlated with historical sales levels and 
historical changes in sales. Because of the assumed constant ratio an increase or decrease in 
the rate of sales growth is expected to provide a proportional change in the growth rate of 
capital accumulation. Even with relaxed restrictions the growth rate in sales can be shown to 
still be related to the investment opportunities the firm has available. For this purpose both 
current sales and the change in sales will be tested as measures, in place of %, to control for 
the firm’s investment opportunities. The new investment model using the sales accelerator 
model becomes: 
, 
!, 
= * + + + ,-
., /-
!, 
+ ,0
1, 
!, 
− ,3
4, 
!, 
+ & 																																																																								2 
Where   is the investment in capital, . /- is the previous period’s sales and consists of the 
previous level of sales and the previous change in sales, 1  is the change in financial assets. 
Each of these measures are weighted by ! , the firm’s net capital. The firm’s leverage, the 
ratio of the firm’s debt to assets, 6,
,
, is included to help account for the increasing cost 
associated with debt borrowing and the possibility of the firm exhausting their capacity for 
debt. *and +  are dummy variables to capture individual and year specific effects 
respectively. 
If the firm has access to the credit markets or can easily issue additional equity, the cash flow 
to the firm should not affect the firm’s level of investment. In this case ,0 is expected to be 
equal to zero. If ,0 is significantly different from zero we can state that the previous change 
in cash position of the firm influences the investment decision, controlling for the firm’s sales 
level, change in sales, and leverage. The most common explanation for this influence would 
be that the firm cannot access enough external financing to pursue all of the available 
investment opportunities, and is forced to wait for internal financing to accumulate. If the 
wealth tax increases the level of financial constraint a firm faces, a firm with a primary owner 
subject to the tax would be expected to have a more statistically significant ,0. The effect of 
leverage (,3) is expected to be negative only for firms that are financially constrained, and 
may be magnified by the wealth tax. 
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3.2 The Caggese Model 
The second model considered was built by Caggese (2007) to address the concerns associated 
with the non-linearity of investment in physical capital and detect if a firm was cash 
constrained. Both model arrive a similar reduced form equations with a measure of 
investment on the left hand of the equation which should be explained effectively by 
observable firm characteristics. Both models also contain a measure of the firm’s liquidity 
which is theorized to have no impact on the investment decision assuming that the firm has 
access to external financing. This model started not with the above capital market arbitrage 
model, but with the following Cobb-Douglass production function: 
7, = 8, 9, 
: ;	           where  * + < < 1 
Where 7(,) is the firm’s output measured in sales revenue, θ(,) is the total factor productivity, 
9(,) is the firm’s fixed long term capital, and ;(,) is the firm’s short term variable capital. 
Because this model focuses on types of capital investment labor in not included as an input. 
While 9(,) in the Caggese model is only the fixed long-term portion of the firm’s assets, it is 
functionally similar to K(,) in the sales accelerator model. This is because K(,) is the firm’s 
total assets, and with the majority of a firm’s variable capital is not capitalized, it will only 
capture a few asset classes that are not included in the Caggese model’s fixed capital, such as 
inventory.  
The firm’s wealth is then maximized with respect to a capital constraint based to the firm’s 
internal financial wealth on the investment level and a non-reversible condition on 
investments in fixed capital k(). The model found that because of the non-reversibility of 
long-term fixed capital it was a poor instrument for measuring a firm’s capital constraints. 
Instead non-fixed variable capital n() was expected to be more responsive to constraints on 
the firm’s ability to invest and grow. Non-fixed variable capital is separated from fixed (or 
quasi-fixed) capital by its non-permanence. This form of “capital” is consumed by the 
business in the period it is purchased in and not capitalized on the books, it consists primarily 
of raw materials and inputs to the production process. 
The final developed model by Caggese is: 
ln ;, = " + + + <- ln 8, /- + <0 ln 9, + <3 lnA, /-
B +	&, 																																																3 
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Where the factors θ(,)/-, and k(,) are from the above Cobb Douglas production function. k(,) 
as included in equation 3 is similar to K(,) used in equation 2, in that they are both 
measures of firm capital, but due to the assumptions used in the models k(,) is variable capital 
and K(,) is fixed long-term capital. In the Caggese model the firm’s financial wealth, w(,)/-E  is 
used to calculate the maximum feasible investment, which is shown to be less than the 
optimum investment for growing firms. Under the assumption that this constraint does not 
hold, and the firm has access to external capital, then the firm’s wealth is not relevant to the 
investment decision and <3 is expected to be equal to zero. The derivation of this model is 
helpful in that it is able to directly incorporate the wealth tax as a direct decrease in the firm’s 
stock of internal financial wealth, which implies that it will also be irrelevant to the 
investment decisions of non-constrained firms. The additional constraint caused by the wealth 
tax is expected to increase the magnitude and significance of <3, as well as increase the 
number of firm’s whose internal funds are no longer sufficient to cover their investment 
opportunities. 
This model has a few concerns, primarily the simultaneity implied by the model in the 
determination of the optimal investment among the three factors n(,) and k(,). Another concern 
for the accurate estimation of the model is that w(,)/-E  can be deconstructed into w(,)/0E +
y(,)/-, the period t − 1 initial wealth and the firm’s net income over the period. Therefore any 
correlation between the firm’s variable capital and the previous period’s sales would be 
detected by <3. This effect is compounded by the fact that cash constrained firms by 
definition have low financial wealth relative to their yearly income, meaning that in these 
firms w(,)/-E  will be more correlated with y(,)/- than w(,)/0E  as the previous wealth is expected 
to be smaller relative to the firm’s income. As the stock of wealth in the firm approaches zero 
then the wealth available for investment at time t becomes simply the income received the 
previous period. 
To address these concerns, Caggese suggested the model could be transformed into: 
G; ;, = * + + + ,- G; 7, /- + ,0 G; A, /-
B + H, 
I 																																																																					4	
This removes the co-allocated production factors at the same time as explicitly removing the 
effect of the previous period’s income from the measure of the firm’s financial wealth. In this 
specification the estimated coefficient π0 will behave identically to <3 in equation 3. 
Because accumulated wealth, w)/-E , may be close to zero for any firm whose constraints are 
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such that all income is invested each period the capital constraint may also appear as an 
increase in π-, the firm’s responsiveness to income, between constrained and non-constrained 
firms. This transformation is also helpful as it aligns the two models functional forms. The 
estimated coefficients π- & π0 perform similar roles in each model, where π- captures the 
firm’s responsiveness to market improvements and π0 captures the excess effect of internal 
financing on the firm’s investment decisions. 
The transformation does not however correct the model’s primary downside, in attempting to 
overcome the concerns with the responsiveness of the Q (or sales accelerator) model’s focus 
on fixed capital investment the Caggese model has lost sight of the original question of 
interest, “does the wealth tax decrease long term economic performance by limiting firm 
level investments?” The model instead detects if the wealth tax imposes capital constraints on 
the firm while simultaneously claiming that those constraints have little impact on the firm’s 
investments into long-term fixed capital capacity. Instead the capital constraints are explicitly 
assumed to be short term limits on the level of production output a firm can manage while 
still expecting the firm to be able to obtain optimal capital levels in the long-run. 
3.3 The Two Models 
Neither of the two models is perfect for modeling the investigated firms. The sales 
accelerator model focuses directly on the question of interest, the firm’s investment in 
physical capital. This focus is also its biggest weakness, as the variation in capital investment 
proves difficult to fit empirical models to. The Caggese model looks at a much more smooth 
and responsive variable, but can only speak to the severity of the capital constraints faced by 
the firms. It is therefore of interest to estimate both models and compare the results in order 
to ascertain the effects of the wealth tax. 
The similarities and differences between the two models are also worth taking a moment to 
consider. Both models measure a one period flow of resources as the dependent variable. In 
the sales accelerator model it is the change in the level of fixed capital stock, while the 
Caggese model looks at the amount of discretionary capital consumed during the period. Both 
models adjust this measure to account for non-normality in the size of businesses and their 
investments. In the sales accelerator model, which is based on the Q model of investing, the 
investment level is theorized to be related to the current size of the firm’s capital stock. The 
Caggese model however uses the exponential nature of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function to argue that the variables should be log-normal. 
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The independent variables in each model are similar as well, both models include the 
previous period’s performance and the net financial wealth of the firm. The sales accelerator 
model includes previous sales and the change in previous sales as the indicators of the firm’s 
previous performance, while the Caggese model simply uses the previous period’s net 
income. The net financial wealth is separated in the sales accelerator model into the firm’s 
financial assets and total debt, unlike the Caggese model which combines the two measures 
into the net financial wealth. 
4. The Data  
4.1 Panel Description 
The anonymized data for this project was provided by Statistics Norway (SSB). It was an 
unbalanced panel of 31,428 individual closely held private firms for the years 2005 to 2009. 
The data was collated by SSB and included a mixture of firm and owner information. 
Because the wealth tax is a personal tax and not a direct corporate tax, each firm’s accounting 
data was merged with the primary owner’s tax liability information. The firm data consisted 
of end of the year accounting data, as well as information on taxes paid. The owner data 
contained all reported tax relevant information, including taxes paid, various types of wealth 
holdings, and personal and family characteristics. The primary owner of each firm was 
determined from the business register. 
In general the 2005 observations were removed from the tests due to possible contamination 
from the corporate tax changes that took effect at the end of the year 2004. The exception to 
this rule is the inclusion of 2005 end of year accounting stock variables in the calculation of 
2006’s flow variables. For instance the investments made in 2006 were calculated using the 
change in balance sheet items from the beginning of 2006, which was 2005’s end of year 
data, to the end of 2006, which is recorded in the system as the firm’s 2006 accounting data. 
Most of the 2005 tax reform effects are expected to appear as flow variables during 2004 and 
2005 (Alstadsæter & Fjærli, 2009), this implies that the end of year stock variables should 
have already taken into account any pertinent effects. Because the values are only being used 
as the baseline for future changes they should not provide any contaminating effects. The 
removal of the 2005 observations from the regressions will remove approximately a fifth of 
the sample size. This loss of size is preferable to allowing the possibility of confounding 
effects into the model estimation.   
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 The owner’s marginal tax rate on wealth was calculated by Statistics Norway’s Lotte
model. Developed originally in the 1970’s the model has been an important policy tool used 
by the Norweg
information from individual tax returns and the Norwegian Household Register. This 
information was used to simulate the change in tax due for an individual if their net worth 
was increased, the percentage of this additional wealth that was required to be paid as a tax 
was then calculated as the marginal tax rate on wealth for the individual. (
The average marginal wealth tax rate is 0.50%, with a minimum rate of 0 an
calculated rate of 2.2. The expected maximum rate was 1.1, which is the effective rate stated 
by Norwegian law, less than 0.5% of the sample exceeded this marginal rate and this 
anomaly is due to the increased wealth causing the individual to n
unrelated tax breaks and therefore it is an accurate estimation of the cost the individual would 
face from increasing their taxable net wealth.  Approximately 30% of the observations have a 
marginal rate equal to the 1.1 maximum, a
minimum rate observed. Any firm whose primary owner has a non
wealth is considered to be subject to the constraint of the wealth tax for purposes of 
separation into research groups, ev
stated rate of 1.1%.
There is evidence of tax motivated adjustment to an individual’s net wealth directly at the 
point where it becomes taxable at 1.4 million kroner. Figure 8 is the sample density of 
individual net wealth around the cutoff point, first for the entire sample t
4.2 The Owner’s Wealth Tax Obligation
ian Ministry of Finance to calculate tax effects. The model contains detailed 
 
Figure 8
Total Sample 
en if the owner has a marginal wealth rate less than the 
: Density of Net Wealth around 1.4 Million
 
 
nd 43% have a marginal tax rate of zero, the 
                 
Aasness, 2006)
o longer be eligible for 
-zero marginal tax rate for 
 
    2009 Only 
hen for only the last 
d a maximum 
15 
-Skatt 
 
 
SNF Working Paper No 41/12
 16 
year of the panel. The lower concentration of observations at 1.4 million increased each year 
since the 2006 change so that it is easily identifiable by 2008 and 2009. This effect may be 
due to a form of tax evasion where assets of higher value are not reported or underreported; 
alternatively it could indicate an investment disincentive where individuals near the threshold 
no longer invest because the tax burden from crossing the threshold is too great. 
4.3 Data Used 
The two models used in this paper are the sales accelerator model 
, 
!, 
= * + + + ,-
., /-
!, 
+ ,0
1, 
!, 
− ,3
4, 
!, 
+ &,  
and the Caggese model 
ln ;, = * + + + ,- ln 7, /- + ,0 lnA, /-
B + H, 
I
 
Table 1 gives an overview of the variables used in these models and how they were 
calculated. 
Table 1: An Overview Variables and their Calculations. 
 
* Individual Dummy Variable Provied by use of the Fixed Effects Estimator 
+  Time Dummy Variable  
!  Total Capital Assets Book value of fixed assets 
  Investment ∆Long-term physical capital 
. /- Previous Sales Sales as reported in the Accounting Register 
1  Change in Cash ∆Cash as reported in the Accounting Register 
4  Debt The firm’s total Liabilities 
;,  Change in Working Capital ∆Current Assets + Expenses 
7, /- Previous Net Income Net Income as reported in the Accounting Register 
A, /-
B
 
Previous Stock Financial Wealth Cash and Liquid Financial Assets less Outstanding Debt 
 
The two equations were defined so that for each model the coefficient ,- represents the 
firm’s expected change in investment given an increase in the model’s measure of business 
performance. In both of the models ,0 is the coefficient that is expected to be non-zero only 
in the presence of constraints on the firm’s access to external financing. 
5. Testing Specifications 
In their seminal paper on firm cash constraints, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) 
separated the firms into two groups reasoned a priori to either face capital constraints or not 
and tested for differences in the sensitivity to cash flows between the two groups. Since then 
this method has been standard for investigating if a firm is constrained or not. The most 
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common separation criteria used are dividend payouts, affiliation to industrial groups or 
banks, the firm’s size and age, the presence of bond ratings, or the degree of shareholder 
concentration (Schiantarelli, 1996). Of the above criteria, the average dividend payout ratio, 
the firm’s size, age, and degree of shareholder concentration will be tested as sorting criteria.  
The dividend payout is slightly problematic as the recent 2004 corporate tax law changes are 
expected to decrease the firm dividend payouts significantly and much of the variation in 
dividend levels may have been lost. The firm’s size is also problematic due to the possible 
correlation between large firm size and large owner wealth. Because the only criteria 
determining if an individual owner is subject to the wealth tax, sorting by firm size may be 
equivalent to sorting by the owner’s wealth tax status. The age and shareholder concentration 
are therefore expected to be the best sorting criteria.  
These sorting criteria will be used to investigate three different concerns relating to the 
wealth tax’s theorized capital constraining effects. The main theory is that the owner being 
subject to the wealth tax is enough to capitally constrain the firm. If this is not the case then 
the wealth tax is expected to at least worsen the capital constraints experienced by firms who 
are already experiencing difficulty accessing external credit markets. The third concern with 
the wealth tax is that it places an undue burden on young firms, who are the most sensitive to 
the availability of financing. 
Using the framework of a priori separation each of the two models will be used to compare 
different groups of firms’ investment decisions sensitivity to internal financing. First, each of 
the two models previously discussed will be estimated using the Fixed Effects estimator with 
the firms being separated into two groups based on the owner’s wealth tax burden. If the 
wealth tax does not impose any additional capital constraint then the estimated value of ,0 
will be identical between the two groups. 
Then the firms will be separated into those expected to be constrained and non-constrained 
firms based on the standard sorting criteria discussed above. The firms within the constrained 
and non-constrained groups will then be further split into taxed and non-taxed groups based 
on the primary owner’s wealth tax burden.  
 Constrained Unconstrained 
Tax Paying Group 1 Group 2 
Non-Taxed Group 3 Group 4 
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The taxed and non-taxed groups will be compared; with the expectation being that if the 
wealth tax does not add an additional capital constraint there should be no difference in the 
value of  ,0 within the groups expected to be constrained or not. For these investigations to 
be meaningful the sorting criteria used would need to accurately separate firms into the 
constrained and non-constrained groups. If ,0 is not significantly different between these two 
groups then that sorting criteria will not provide any useful information beyond the results 
from the first investigation. 
Testing the wealth tax’s effect on firms in different stages of their lifecycle is functionally 
identical to the previous investigation, however requires a sorting criteria that is capable of 
distinguishing between firms in different lifecycle stages. The sorting criteria that will be 
used is the firm’s ratio of retained earnings to total equity, as proposed by DeAngelo et al. 
(2006), who found that this measure was a highly significant proxy for the firm’s lifecycle for 
purposes of predicting dividend payments. 
6. Results 
6.1 Unit Root Tests 
The Harris-Tzavalis unit root test rejected the null hypothesis of the series containing a unit 
root, table 2. Because the series were all found to be stationary further differencing is not 
required before the series can be used to estimate the model. 
Table 2: Results of the Harris-Tzavalis Unit Root Test 
 
Investment 
/Assets 
Sales 
/Assets 
∆Sales 
/Assets 
Cash 
/Assets 
Debt 
/Assets Ln(Sales) 
Ln(Financial 
Assets) 
Ln(Current 
Assets) 
Harris-
Tzavalis 
H0: Unit Root 
-0.3598 
0.0000 
-0.3091 
0.0000 
-0.4859 
0.0000 
-0.4917 
0.0000 
-0.3664 
0.0000 
0.1370 
0.0000 
0.0329 
0.0000 
-0.2836 
0.0000 
The chart shows the estimated rho coefficient for the Harris-Tzavalis test above the p-value for the test 
 
6.2 Separation by Wealth Tax Obligation 
The two models, equation 2 and 4 were estimated after splitting the sample into two 
groups based on the owner’s current wealth tax burden. The taxed group consisted of 138,226 
individual observations compared to the non-taxed group’s 106,085 observations.  
For the sales accelerator model, the previous period sales was only a significant indicator of 
investment level for the firms subject to the wealth tax, and the previous period’s change in 
sales was not significant for either group. The leverage was significant and positive for each 
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group, at the 1% level for the non-taxed group and the 5% level for the taxed firms, though 
the difference was not significant. The firm leverage was expected to detect the decreased 
investment caused by the increasing cost of debt as the leverage increases, and was therefore 
theorized to have a negative sign. The positive sign may indicate that the variable is instead 
detecting the financing structure of the firm’s investment. If the firm has access to debt 
financing and primarily uses it to finance investments in physical capital, the leverage would 
increase with capital investment. This would indicate that neither group is, on average, 
strictly capitally constrained and that both groups still have access to the debt markets.  
Table 3: the estimated investment sensitivity to cash 
 Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed 
Sales Accelerator Model -.10899 ** 1.76 .00344 
Caggese Model .11138 ** -2.15 .08459 ** 
The chart shows the estimated coefficient used to detect capital constraints in each. The column labeled “significance of 
difference” contains the t-test statistic of the test that the two adjacent coefficients are equal. 
* Significant at 5%     ** Significant at 1% 
 
None of the coefficients were individually significantly (at the 5% level) different for this 
model between the taxed and non-taxed groups. The only variable found to be significantly 
different between the two groups at the 10% level was the change in firm cash, though the 
model shows that the taxed firms are less sensitive to changes in cash, the opposite of the 
expected result. The sign of cash, if significant, was expected to be positive, instead the only 
significant coefficient was negative. The investment in an unconstrained firm would be 
expected to be unrelated to the change in the firm’s cash, the negative coefficient is therefore 
detecting an undue interdependence between cash and capital investment in these firms, just 
not the relationship hypothesized. Instead the model seems to be capturing the firm’s forced 
tradeoff between a high level of investment and accruing financial assets. This tradeoff would 
be more pronounced in the firms who have lesser access to external funding and rely 
primarily on internal cash for investments. In this way the excess correlation between the 
changes in the firm’s cash and its investment level would indicate not a capital constraint, but 
higher investment sensitivity to internal funds. Those firms whose primary owner is subject 
to the wealth tax were not found to have this high investment sensitivity to internal funds. 
In the Caggese model both firms have a positive and significant coefficient for the net 
financial assets, indicating that the average firm in both groups faces capital constrained 
investment decisions. This model also found that the investment decisions in firms with a 
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primary owner subject to the wealth tax are on average significantly less sensitive to the 
availability of internal firm financing, reaffirming the results from the Sales Accelerator 
Model. There are a few possible causes for this unexpected result. This outcome may be due 
to the wealth tax status signaling that the primary owners have additional capital available to 
invest. Because paying the wealth tax is based on the owner’s total capital, it may be 
correlated with the size of the firm or other factors that would prevent the firm from being 
cash constrained. The final reason could be a social one, as currently only the wealthiest 17% 
of households in Norway pay the wealth tax this variable can be seen as an indicator of the 
owner being in the upper echelon of the social network. This social status may afford their 
businesses easier access to loans or external equity to use for investing. 
The lagged value of sales in the Caggese model is significant for the untaxed firms, but has 
an unexpected sign, which may indicate a misspecification in the model. This coefficient is 
significantly different between the two groups, with the taxed group having a coefficient 
closer to zero than the estimated coefficient for the untaxed firms, at a 1% significance level, 
while still being different than zero at the 5% level. 
The two models together suggest that the firms in the panel are on average subject to some 
amount of influence on their investment decisions based on the available financing. The long 
term durable assets were found to be highly collateralized for both taxed and untaxed firms, 
with no significant difference found between the two groups. For this asset group the firms 
were able to secure any needed external financing. The average firm in the non-taxed group 
was however found to be sensitive to the amount of internal financing available when making 
investment decisions. This sensitivity was significantly reduced for the firms subject to the 
wealth tax, with the firms in being found to have no forced tradeoff between amassing long-
term physical capital and financial reserves. The differences found in the investment models 
between the two groups indicate that the firms whose primary owner is subject to the wealth 
tax have, on average, better access to external substitutes for internal financing. 
6.3 The Wealth Tax Effect on Constrained Firms 
In this section we attempt to address concerns that the above results are due to a correlation 
between the firm’s tax status and other causes of capital constraints, or other indicators of 
capital market access. Table 4 shows the number of observations in each of the four possible 
groups based on the previously discussed measures of constraint and the owner’s tax status. 
The portion of the untaxed firms that are also considered to be capital constrained is higher 
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for each measure except the dividend measures. The biggest difference can be seen in the 
firms separated by the median firm size, indicating that the firms subject to the wealth tax are 
on average larger.  
Table 4: Number of Observations by Group Pairing 
 Unconstrained 
& Untaxed 
Unconstrained 
& Taxed 
Constrained 
& Untaxed 
Constrained 
& Taxed 
Percent 
Untaxed 
Percent 
Taxed 
Mean Size 10657 35200 95428 103026 90% 75% 
Median Size 38536 83311 67549 54915 64% 40% 
Share 1 20048 37700 86037 100526 81% 73% 
Share 2 44640 68465 61445 69761 58% 50% 
Dividend 1 42641 52273 63444 85953 60% 62% 
Dividend 2 48169 56247 57916 81979 55% 59% 
 
Neither the mean nor median size proved to be effective at separating the firms based on 
sensitivity to cash in the sales accelerator model. The subsample groups suffered from their 
reduced sample size, and therefore had larger standard errors than the previous non-separated 
estimations. The taxed group was found to be significantly more sensitive to cash flows for 
the subset of firms with long-term fixed assets less than the median value, however the firms 
in this subset cannot be said to be significantly different from the firms above the median 
value. The Caggese model found that the firm size was significant at separating the taxed 
firms into more and less financially sensitive firms, however the smaller firms were found to 
be less sensitive than the larger firms in both specifications. With the exception of the group 
of firms larger than the median value, there was no significant difference in the capital 
constraints faced by the taxed and non-taxed firms, and that group found the taxed firms to be 
less sensitive to the firm wealth.  
The percentage of equity held by the primary owner was a borderline significant sorting 
criteria for the Sales Accelerator if the constrained firms were defined as any firm where the 
primary owner possessed at least 50% of the total equity. The sorting criteria did not 
significantly detect differences in capital constraints according to the Caggese model, and the 
taxed firms were found to either be equivalent to the similarly sorted untaxed firms, or less 
sensitive to internal financing. 
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Table 5: The Coefficient Estimations for the Sensitivity to Internal Cash with  
Firms Separated by Median and Mean Size 
 
Sales Accelerator Mean     Caggese Mean 
 Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed   
Non-
taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed 
Constrained -.22948 1.40 .11032  Constrained .07141 ** 1.52 .05945 ** 
Significance of 
Difference 1.35  .052  
Significance of 
Difference 1.83  2.80 
Non-Constrained -.07686 ** 0.83 .0015  Non-Constrained .00902 1.68 .12433 ** 
 
Sales Accelerator Median     Caggese Median 
 Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed   Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed 
Constrained -.01777 2.28 -.1381 **  Constrained .07065 ** 0.90 .05753 ** 
Significance of 
Difference 0.89  0.56  
Significance of 
Difference 0.38  2.57 
Non-Constrained -.08132 ** 1.31 .00229  Non-Constrained .10652 ** 2.07 .09556 ** 
The chart shows the estimated coefficient used to detect capital constraints in each model. The column and row labeled 
“significance of difference” contains the t-test statistic of the test that the two adjacent coefficients are equal. 
* Significant at 5%     ** Significant at 1% 
 
The firm’s dividend ratio proved unable to separate the firms based on the severity of their 
capital constraints. The taxed and non-taxed groups are not significantly different, at the 5% 
level, in any of the groups tested. Because the dividend policy of the firms is not of any 
interest outside of a possible signal of capital constraints no further information could be 
gained from this specification. 
Table 6: The Coefficient Estimations for the Sensitivity to Internal Cash with  
Firms Separated by Concentration of Ownership 
Sales Accelerator Ownership >50%    Caggese Ownership > 50% 
 Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed   Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed 
Constrained -.24454 ** 1.80 .00631  Constrained .07723 ** 1.35 .08083 ** 
Significance of 
Difference 1.90  1.73  
Significance of 
Difference 0.20  1.66 
Non-Constrained -.08861 ** 0.79 -.15841  Non-Constrained .05668 0.30 .03489 
 
 
Sales Accelerator Ownership > 60%    Caggese Ownership > 60% 
 
Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed 
  
 Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed 
Constrained -.18163 ** 2.94 .00683  Constrained .07629 ** 0.65 .08941 ** 
Significance of 
Difference 1.49  1.40  
Significance of 
Difference 1.17  1.81 
Non-Constrained -.08743 ** 0.29 -.07136  Non-Constrained .08709 ** 3.40 .04591 ** 
The chart shows the estimated coefficient used to detect capital constraints in each model. The column and row labeled 
“significance of difference” contains the t-test statistic of the test that the two adjacent coefficients are equal. 
* Significant at 5%     ** Significant at 1% 
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Table 7: The Coefficient Estimations for the Sensitivity to Internal Cash with  
Firms Separated by Dividend Payment Ratio 
Sales Accelerator Dividend Payment < 5% of Income  Caggese Dividend Payment < 5% of Income 
 Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed   Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed 
Constrained -.11656 ** 0.04 -.09425  Constrained .07388 ** 1.88 .05147 ** 
Significance of 
Difference 0.99  0.02  
Significance of 
Difference 1.35  1.15 
Non-Constrained -.00282 0.44 .01984  Non-Constrained -.0238 1.02 .29231 ** 
 
Sales Accelerator Dividend Payment < 10% of Income  Caggese Dividend Payment < 10% of Income 
 Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed   Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed 
Constrained -.11407 ** 0.08 -.10822  Constrained .08927 ** 2.09 .0512 ** 
Significance of 
Difference 
0.51 
0.613  
0.05 
0.959  
Significance of 
Difference 1.60  
1.11 
 
Non-Constrained -.05315 * 1.67 .02011  Non-Constrained .02108 0.70 .2225 ** 
The chart shows the estimated coefficient used to detect capital constraints in each model. The column and row labeled 
“significance of difference” contains the t-test statistic of the test that the two adjacent coefficients are equal. 
* Significant at 5%     ** Significant at 1% 
 
If the firms are separated into constrained and non-constrained groups based on the classical 
distinction of capital constraint for a firm, the act of paying a dividend during the period, we 
find that the separation criteria performs poorly. The firms which pay dividends are on 
average no more sensitive to the internal financing of the firm than those that retain their 
earnings. The finding of increased sensitivity to internal financing for firms paying a dividend 
in the Caggese model, presented in table 8, contradicts the earlier findings of no difference 
and is difficult to discuss as the dividend payment is not a valid indicator of capital 
constraint. Without the separation criteria validly distinguishing between the constrained and 
non-constrained firms, the proper measure of the effect of the wealth tax would be the results 
from the total sample presented in section 6.2.  
 
Table 8: The Coefficient Estimations for the Sensitivity to Internal Cash with Firms Separated  
Into Those Paying or Not Paying Dividends in the Current Period 
Sales Accelerator       Caggese  
 Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed   Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed 
Constrained -.06579 0.75 -.37399  Constrained .21473 * 0.96 .03029 
Significance of 
Difference 0.14  0.79  
Significance of 
Difference 1.10  0.77 
Non-Constrained -.09635 * 1.60 -.00159  Non-Constrained .05947 ** 2.21 .0737 ** 
The chart shows the estimated coefficient used to detect capital constraints in each model. The column and row labeled 
“significance of difference” contains the t-test statistic of the test that the two adjacent coefficients are equal. 
* Significant at 5%     ** Significant at 1% 
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Overall the standard separation criteria proved to be ineffective at distinguishing between the 
capitally constrained and non-constrained firms. Despite these limitations, in every subset 
tested the firms subject to the wealth tax were either equivalent to or less sensitive to internal 
financing than the untaxed firms. 
6.4 The Wealth Tax and Immature Firms 
The firm’s lifecycle measure, as defined by the ratio of retained earnings to total equity, 
remained as poor at categorizing the firms into more and less capital sensitive as the more 
traditional measures. This may be due to the arbitrary nature of the decision of where to place 
the cutoff point, as the theory states no exact level of retained earnings that indicates a firm 
has left the growth phase. The cutoff points defined split the untaxed firms evenly, while the 
taxed firms skewed largely to the unconstrained end of the spectrum. This indicates that these 
firms have either been operating longer, are significantly more profitable, or their financing 
structure relies more heavily on debt financing than contributed equity. 
 
 
Table 9: Number of Firms by Group 
 Untaxed Taxed 
Unconstrained LC1 61,512 109,066 
Constrained LC1 44,573 29,160 
Unconstrained LC2 56,948 103,704 
Constrained LC2 49,137 34,522 
 
The financial responsiveness of the taxed firms in the sales accelerator model was not found 
to be significantly different from zero for any of the groups. The investment in non-
constrained firms was less sensitive to the firm’s cash flow than the non-taxed group at the 
1% level, while the capitally constrained groups were not significantly different. The standard 
error calculated for the constrained firms subject to the wealth tax was much greater than the 
standard errors for the other groups, which indicates the firms in this group vary widely in 
their capitally constrained status, compared to the other groups. 
The less mature firms, in this instance indicated as capitally constrained, subject to the wealth 
tax were found to only vary significantly from their non-taxed compatriots in their estimated 
coefficient of leverage; the significance is not great though, with a p-value of 0.063 and only 
for using the more restrictive separation criteria. The value of leverage for both groups is, as 
was discussed in section 6.2, positive, indicating that the variable is capturing the firm’s 
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financing structure rather than the capital constraints. If the significance is not spurious this 
would lend support to the observation that firms subject to the wealth tax use more debt 
financing, or have easier access to debt financing in the early stages of their growth. The 
regressions for the unconstrained firms found the leverage irrelevant in the investment 
models. 
The Caggese model showed a curious effect, while the lifecycle indicator was unable to 
predict the level of constraint the firm faces, it does find that more mature firms are more 
sensitive to internal capital when investing. This finding is consistent between the two 
definitions used to separate firms. This may either be an indication of the wealth tax 
increasing the firm’s capital constraints, or it may simply be the model detecting a correlation 
between the growth of working capital and financial assets in the more mature firms. The 
Caggese model has consistently found the investment of firms in the sample to be sensitive to 
changes in the firm’s net financial assets. 
 
Table 10: The Coefficient Estimations for the Sensitivity to Internal Cash with  
Firms Separated by Their Ratio of Earned Equity to Contributed Capital 
Sales Accelerator Earned Equity < 5% of Contributed Capital Caggese Earned Equity < 5% of Contributed Capital 
 Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed   Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed 
Constrained -.10036 ** 0.94 -.61275  Constrained .08690 0.27 .11978 ** 
Significance of 
Difference 0.29  0.96  
Significance of 
Difference 1.90  0.20 
Non-Constrained -.08785 ** 4.34 .00614  Non-Constrained .05477 ** 4.83 .07176 ** 
 
Sales Accelerator Earned Equity < 20% of Contributed Capital Caggese Earned Equity < 20% of Contributed Capital 
 Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed   Non-taxed 
Significance 
of Difference Taxed 
Constrained -.11366 ** 1.67 -.89567  Constrained .05147 0.64 .07462 * 
Significance of 
Difference 0.62  1.72  
Significance of 
Difference 0.67  0.94 
Non-Constrained -.08939 ** 4.30 .058939  Non-Constrained .05466 ** 2.22 .07284 ** 
The chart shows the estimated coefficient used to detect capital constraints in each model. The column and row labeled 
“significance of difference” contains the t-test statistic of the test that the two adjacent coefficients are equal. 
* Significant at 5%     ** Significant at 1% 
 
6.5 Other Findings 
In addition to the wealth tax making investment more sensitive to the financial assets of the 
firm, there is a possibility that the additional cost associated with the tax may make a firm 
less responsive to market opportunities. Since knowing the actual investment opportunities 
are impossible the above models used the firm’s sales as a proxy for the firm’s investment 
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needs. If a firm subject to the wealth tax cannot take advantage of these opportunities as well 
then the coefficient in front of sales measure multiplied by the wealth tax dummy in the 
Chow specification test should be negative and significant. The results in table 11 show that 
for the sales accelerator model the investment responsiveness to sales is not significantly 
different from zero, while in the Caggese model the coefficient for the constrained groups is 
significant and positive. Therefore the taxed firms are found to be more responsive to sales if 
sorted by common indicators of capital constraints. Given that the separation criteria proved 
incorrectly specified in all cases, the best measure for the difference in responsiveness to 
sales is the estimated coefficient for the total, non-sorted panel.  
The coefficients in front of the previous period’s sales and the change in sales in the sales 
accelerator model were not significantly different from zero, meaning that a firm’s 
investment in physical assets was not appreciably less responsive to changes in firm 
performance if the owner pays the wealth tax. The Caggese model estimated the coefficient 
of the taxed sales as 0.10, a positive and significant value at a 1% confidence level. The 
coefficient of sales for the non-taxed firms in the panel was significant and negative, with an 
estimated value of -0.23.  This means that the taxed firms are less responsive to sales, 
however the untaxed firms are estimated to be responding negatively to sales when investing. 
Table 11: Responsiveness to sales 
Model SA – 
Unconstrained 
SA – 
Constrained 
Caggese – 
Unconstrained 
Caggese – 
Constrained 
Size 1 .018 .037 .021 .084 ** 
Size 2 .0057 .0093 .137 ** .071 ** 
Share 1 .058 .040 .012 .120 ** 
Share 2 .032 .166 ** .098 ** .110 ** 
Dividend 1 -.268 .078 * .086 .082 ** 
Dividend 2 -.248 * .071 .097 .087 ** 
Dividend 3 -.0006 -.018 .105 ** .192 * 
Lifecycle 1 .111 ** .036 .063 .076 ** 
Lifecycle 2 .103 ** .038 .088 ** .157 ** 
  The estimations of the coefficient for sales multiplied by the wealth tax indicator variable. 
* Significant at 5%     ** Significant at 1% 
 
  
7. Conclusion 
In almost all tested specifications the firms whose primary owner paid the wealth tax were 
less likely to be sensitive to the internal financing when making investment decisions; these 
firms did not face the same tradeoff between amassing physical productive capital and 
financial assets. This effect persisted even after the firms were split into groups based on their 
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expected a priori status of capital constraints. The firms in the panel, however, proved to not 
be separable into constrained and unconstrained using conventional methods. This may be an 
indication that traditional measures such as size and agency costs may be less relevant for 
small privately held firm’s access to external financing. The wealth tax indicator proved to be 
the best criteria for separating firms based on their sensitivity to internal financing, though 
the effect was not in the direction expected.  
Because the two models proved to be poor predictors of firm behavior in this panel, it is 
possible that this paper’s inability to find any increased capital constraints from the wealth 
tax is simply due to the model’s poor fit. It is also possible that the wealth tax is an indicator 
of the owner’s social status and financial capacity, both of which would give a small private 
firm an advantage in accessing to external credit.  
The findings in this paper are not a causal relationship, but a correlation. Regrettably the 
2004/2005 corporate tax overhaul in Norway, combined with the short timeframe of the 
available panel made fully exploiting the wealth tax law change to determine a causal 
relationship impossible. Even without a causal relationship the findings are of policy 
importance. Because the wealth tax only affects the individual firms within the sample found 
to be the most robust to changes in internal financing, the wealth tax should not place a 
capital constraint on the businesses it affects. The tax was also not associated with an excess 
burden on the less mature firms, as the firms in this subset subject to the wealth tax were not 
significantly more sensitive to the availability of internal financing than the nontaxed firms 
but were shown to be more responsive to changes in market conditions. 
In all, no evidence was found to support the claim that the wealth tax increases the capital 
constraints that a firm faces. The findings suggest that non-financial and unobservable 
characteristics of the firms owned by payers of the wealth tax may allow these firms better 
access to external resources and to rely less on internal financing than other small private 
firms. Alternatively the findings could simply indicate that the models used are ill suited to 
explaining the behavior of non-public firms. If the firms subject to the wealth tax are in fact 
less reliant on internal funding, then by only taxing the most robust private firms in a market 
the wealth tax may have less of a negative impact on investment than a corporate income tax 
which raises a similar level of revenue. This is because a flat corporate income tax will 
always distribute more of the tax burden on to firms that are more vulnerable.  
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This paper investigates if the Norwegian wealth tax imposes capital constraints 
on small privately held businesses. A panel of 31,428 Norwegian firms from 2005 
to 2009 is used to estimate two models of capital constraints. The models are 
estimated using the Fixed Effects method. When firms are sorted a priori into two 
groups based on the wealth tax burden of the primary owner, the non-taxed firms 
are found to be slightly more constrained than the taxed firms, at a 10% and 5% 
confidence level depending on the model. Sorting based on the wealth tax is the 
most effective method of sorting firms into more or less constrained groups, while 
more traditional methods proved ineffective in this panel. The negative capital 
constraining effects of the wealth tax are therefore minimal; the tax affects only 
the private firms least reliant on internal financing.
